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1  INTRODUCTION
The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in De Gree v Webb [2007] 
SCA 87 (RSA)2 is worthy of consideration for a number of reasons, reasons 
which do not include the prominent (emotive) media attention devoted to 
the facts both before the appeal, and the ongoing publicity which occurred in 
diverse press and radio reports after judgment was handed down. This mat-
ter is reportedly further being considered for an appeal to the Constitutional 
Court. This, too, indicates both the public concern with, and vested interests 
in, the outcome of what was widely agreed, ultimately, to be an international 
adoption.3 
An obvious reason why the case warrants airing lies in the strongly worded 
judgments – four in all – penned in the SCA. They raise what are clearly 
issues close to the heart of the individual judges who were called upon to 
adjudicate this specific dispute, and moreover, flag divergent policy choices 
underlying the judicial approaches to child protection insofar as inter-coun-
try adoption is concerned. The case, therefore, provides the opportunity to 
examine the fundamental principles applicable to the international transfer 
of children via the adoption process, and to dissect the role of the court in 
giving effect to the treaty obligations engendered by South Africa’s ratification 
of the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in 
respect of Inter-Country Adoption (1993) (hereafter Hague Convention). The 
suitability of a guardianship application in the High Court to effect the first 
step of an international adoption is considered against the backdrop of the 
requirements of international law. 
1 It is hereby acknowledged that this work is based upon research supported by the National Research 
Foundation.
2 Available at < http://www.law.wits.ac.za/sca/judgment.php?case_id=13538>
3 The vested interests in adoption was highlighted as forming the basis for much ‘children’s rights’ liti-
gation in a review of jurisprudence between 1996 and 2001 surrounding section 28 of the constitu-
tion. See Sloth-Nielsen J ‘Children’s rights in the South African courts: An overview since ratification 
of the UN Convention on the rights of the child’ (2002) 10 (2) International Journal of Children’s 
Rights 137.
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The bald facts of the case were precipitated by the launch in the Johan-
nesburg High Court of an application for an order granting the American ap-
plicants guardianship over a minor baby girl of South African birth, who had 
been abandoned and was in foster care. The ‘respondents’ were opponents in 
name only: they were the child’s existing foster parents, and they did not op-
pose the proposed order. They had become friends of the prospective adop-
tive parents, who had formed a relationship with the child while visiting her 
in their care. Further, it was common cause that, once armed with a guardi-
anship order (without which they would have had great difficulty proceeding 
beyond the borders of the RSA with an unrelated infant), the applicants were 
intending to depart the country, and to pursue an adoption order in the rel-
evant domestic forum in the USA. 
The initial judge4 became concerned about the lack of effective opposition 
in the case, and invited the intervention of an amicus, the Centre for Child 
Law, a public interest litigation unit based at the University of Pretoria. The 
arguments of the amicus won the day in the High Court and, subsequently 
in the SCA, the appellants were also unsuccessful in their pursuit of an order 
granting them guardianship of the child. The majority judgment, penned by 
Theron AJA (in which Snyders AJA concurred) was supplemented by a judg-
ment of Ponnan JA, while minority judgements were handed down by Heher 
JA and Hancke AJA respectively, the former rather more substantive in its 
consideration of the issues at hand.
It must be noted that the majority, including Judge Ponnan, found that the 
suitability of the applicants as prospective adoptive parents was not in dis-
pute. However, the application for an order declaring them to be the guard-
ians of the child constituted the incorrect procedure: the appropriate avenue 
would have been to seek an adoption order in the Children’s Court, as en-
visaged by the Constitutional Court in the case of Minister for Welfare and 
Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 (3) SA 422 (CC), and the relevant 
chapters of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983. In Fitzpatrick, it will be recalled, 
the Constitutional Court struck down those provisions of the Child Care Act 
74 of 1983 that permitted an adoption to be effected only by South African 
citizens, thereby opening the door to inter-country adoptions taking place in 
respect of South African children for the first time. 
Subsequently, South Africa ratified the Hague Convention in 2003, and it 
was common cause in De Gree that the treaty awaits domestication via the 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005, which is only partially in operation (as of 1 July 
2007), as the process of completion of the Act and the regulations thereto are 
still ongoing. The envisaged legislation will not only incorporate the Hague 
Convention principles and procedures in South African law, but will also add 
several new features to our law relating to domestic adoption, including pro-
visions establishing a register of adoptable children and prospective adoptive 
parents (RACAP),5 freeing orders,6 and new provisions to cater in law for 
4 In De Gree and Another v Webb and Others 2006 (6) SA 33 (WLD)
5 S 232 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005
6 S 235 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005
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so-called open adoptions,7 in which some degree of contact is maintained 
between the birth parent(s) and the adoptive parents after the adoption has 
been effected. 
Provisionally, the establishment of an interim Central Authority,8 as re-
quired by the Hague Convention, the drafting and concluding of working 
agreements with adoption agencies and Central Authorities abroad, and the 
conclusion of more than 1 000 inter-country adoptions with the co-operation 
of the interim Central Authority (the National Department of Social Devel-
opment) have taken place over the period 2003 until now, as is comprehen-
sively spelt out in the amicus brief, which is cited in considerable detail in the 
judgment.9 
However, the majority in the SCA held that the principal reason for their 
stance that the guardianship application could not be granted was the evi-
dent conflict between international law (including not only the Hague Con-
vention, but also relevant provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC)10 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACRWC)11 related to inter-country adoption) and the route of pursuing a 
guardianship order chosen by the applicants, as well as the best interests of 
the child principle, which dictated that it was not in the child’s best interest 
to ‘be removed from the country without … the protection and safeguards of 
an adoption first effected in the Children’s Court’.12 
In contrast to this, after referring to article 4 of the Hague Convention 
which deals with the ‘adoptability’ criteria of the child and his or her ‘eligibil-
ity’, as well as the ‘suitability’ of the prospective adoptive parents, Heher JA 
concluded that:
Every principle of the Hague Convention which is relevant to this application (and its 
spirit) has been satisfied by the evidence presented to the court a quo insofar as that was 
practicable.13
Although the case raises many other issues of interest (such as the role of 
an amicus, the desirability or appropriateness of taking into account govern-
ment policy as articulated in adopted, but unpromulgated, legislation, or the 
proper role of the High Court as upper guardian of all minors within its area 
of jurisdiction), the major issue that we address in this note relates to the fun-
damental principles underpinning the Hague Convention. We argue that the 
minority judgments misconceive the nature of the Hague principles and their 
underlying rationale to a significant extent, and further, that even the majority 
judgments do not fully explain the reasons for which the alleged conflict with 
7 S 234 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005
8 A central authority must be identified by a ratifying State Party in it’s depository instrument
9 See, for instance, paras 7 and 19 of the majority judgment, para 51 of the judgment of Heher JA, and 
paras 89–93 of the judgment of Ponnan JA.
10 Ratified on 16 June 1995.
11 Ratified on 7 January 2000.
12 Para 27 of the judgment of Theron AJA
13 Para 48 of the judgment. See, too, the minority judgment of Hancke AJA to the effect that ‘the ap-
plicants produced evidence sufficient to satisfy the law of adoption in South Africa and the Hague 
Convention on Inter-country Adoption, and there is no advantage to the child in having them rehash 
the evidence in the children’s court’ (para 101). 
           
84
the international law provisions render the use of a guardianship procedures 
to effect an inter-country adoption fatally flawed. We also contend that the 
fulfilment of the principle of subsidiarity,14 while remaining at the heart of the 
international law framework established in article 21 of the CRC and article 
24 (b) of the ACRWC, was overemphasised in the minority judgments, at the 
expense of other overarching principles relevant to inter-country adoption. 
However, we do not traverse the subsidiarity principle in very much detail, 
given that it receives adequate elaboration in the texts of the judgments.
In our conclusion, we argue that conferring parental status on a prospec-
tive adoptive parent via a guardianship order violates fundamental constitu-
tional principles and policy considerations, and that sanctioning this avenue 
– even temporarily until the full promulgation of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 
renders this unlawful – is unnecessary and unwarranted.
2   THE SOUTH AFRICAN COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW
In order to put the discussion in context, it is apposite to highlight the status 
of international law in the South African legal system. Fortunately, the South 
African receptiveness to international legal ideas was constitutionalised. Sec-
tion 39 of the Constitution – commonly known as the interpretation clause 
– requires that ‘when interpreting the Bill of Rights... a court must consider 
international law’.15 As early as in S v Makwanyane in 1996, the Constitu-
tional Court indicated its stance towards international law in domestic juris-
prudence, saying that ‘international agreements and customary law provide 
a framework within which … the Bill of Rights can be evaluated and un-
derstood …’16 and ‘… may provide guidance as to the correct interpretation 
of particular provisions’.17 It has been argued, rightly, that the reference to 
14 Which entails that inter-country adoption may only be considered if domestic placement is not an 
option.
15 S 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Constitution gives more value to international law than compara-
tive case law as the Constitution states that a court ‘may consider foreign law’. See generally Currie 
I and De Waal J The Bill of Rights handbook (2005) (5th ed.) 159–162. See also generally Du Plessis 
M ‘The application and influence of U.N. human rights standards in practice: The South African Ex-
perience’ (2002) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 452–457. Hovell & Williams indicate that 33 
per cent of cases dealing with the Bill of Rights (1995-2004) have used international law as opposed 
to only 6 per cent of cases dealing with non-Bill of Rights issues (1995–2004) by the Constitutional 
Court. This is indicative of the fact that the courts should and indeed do give more weight to inter-
national law while interpreting the Bill of Rights of the Constitution as opposed to other sections. 
See Hovell D & Williams G ‘A tale of two systems: The use of international law in constitutional 
interpretation in Australia and South Africa’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 116.
16 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) paras 36–7
17 Ibid. It is interesting to note that the interpretation that the Constitutional Court gives to ‘international 
law’ in this context is not only limited to decisions of comparable interpretative bodies such as the 
United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and 
the European Court of Human Rights, but could also cover a broader array of ‘jurisprudence’ of spe-
cialised agencies. ‘Specialised agency’ in regard to the case at hand could relate to bodies, such as 
UNICEF and the Hague Conference on Private International Law which is a global inter-governmental 
organisation charged with custody of the Hague Convention. Although this body does not issue ‘soft’ 
international legal instruments, such as General Comments, or agree Rules for specific situations (as 
does the UN, e.g. in respect of children deprived of their liberty), its practice notes, manuals and guide-
lines constitute the agreed operational guidelines amongst member nations, and may therefore indeed 
also constitute a form of ‘soft’ ‘international law’ to which our courts may have regard.
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international human rights law in general for purposes of interpretation is not 
limited to instruments that are binding on South Africa (though these have 
more persuasive force)18 but also to other international conventions and to 
international custom.19 In addition, not only is customary international law 
considered law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution 
or an Act of Parliament,20 but the Constitution expressly states that in inter-
preting legislation, an interpretation consistent with international law is to be 
preferred.21 This gives the Court ‘considerable scope in reducing a possible 
conflict between legislation and international law, whether it is customary 
international law or treaty law.’22 In the case at hand, however, the concern 
is not with legislative interpretation, but rather with the interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights (insofar as the best interests of the child in section 28(2), the 
child’s right to family or alternative care in section 28(1)(b), the child’s right 
to protection from abuse, neglect, maltreatment and degradation in section 
28(1)(d), amongst others, are concerned), and the interpretation of the com-
mon law is raised insofar as the role of the institution of the High Court as 
upper guardian of all minors has to be traversed.
Therefore, we suggest that South African courts, tribunals and forums have 
the constitutional obligation to accord, for instance, the Hague Convention 
and its principles (if not also its practices, procedures and guidelines), the ap-
propriate weight it calls for as outlined under the provisions of the Constitu-
tion mentioned above.23 This is the case not only because it is an instrument 
that has been ‘ratified’ by South Africa, but would be necessary even as a 
signed instrument.24 The phrase ‘must consider international law’ under sec-
tion 39(1)(b) imposes an obligation onto the courts to refer to and utilise the 
legal principles under the Hague Convention when performing their interpre-
tive task. According appropriate weight to the Hague Convention entails that, 
as binding international law, it should carry even greater persuasive force 
‘since the lawmakers of the Constitution should not lightly be presumed to 
authorise any law which might constitute a breach of the obligations of the 
State in terms of (such) international law.’25 A South African court cannot 
18 See Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) v President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 
671 (CC) para 26.
19 Dugard J ‘The role of international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights’ (1994) 101 South African 
Journal of Human Rights Law 208
20 S 232 of the Constitution
21 S 233 of the Constitution
22 De Wet E ‘“Friendly but cautious” reception of international law in the jurisprudence of the South 
African Constitutional Court’ (2005) 28 Fordham International Law 1533
23 Note that in the sphere of inter-country adoption, it is not only the Hague Convention which con-
tains relevant international law principles. South Africa has also ratified the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child 
pornography (2000), which provides, inter alia, that ‘State parties shall take all appropriate legal 
and administrative measures to ensure that all persons involved in the adoption of a child act in 
conformity with applicable international legal instruments (article 3(5))’. The Hague Adoption Con-
vention is referred to directly in the Preamble to the Optional Protocol. 
24 For further details, see conclusion section below arguing about the value to be accorded to an in-
ternational treaty signed but not ratified by a country (South Africa) and its status under customary 
international law.
25 Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) v President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 
(CC) para 26
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simply disregard or give ‘lip service’ to the Hague Convention but should 
refer to, analyse and assess the principles of the Hague Convention when 
dealing with cases resembling or directly related to inter-country adoption. 
Moreover, its principles should be used to inform the development of the 
common law to interpret the involvement of High Courts with regards to pro-
spective inter-country adopters acting in contravention of the international 
law to which South Africa is bound.
Supplementary to this, the principles of the CRC and ACRWC, as they are 
both instruments ratified by South Africa, are of great significance in under-
standing the obligations created by section 28 of the Constitution. In Groot-
boom, the applicability of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in South Africa was raised. Although the Court highlight-
ed that ‘[t]he relevant international law can be a guide to interpretation but 
the weight to be attached to any particular principle or rule of international 
law will vary’,26 it was held that ‘where the relevant principle of international 
law binds South Africa, it may be directly applicable’.27 Therefore, in the case 
at hand, for instance, a combined reading of sections 39 and 232 of the Con-
stitution makes it incumbent on South African courts to take stock of and 
apply Article 24(f) of the ACRWC. Article 24(f) of the ACRWC requires follow- 
up once adoption takes place by stating that State Parties shall ‘establish a 
machinery to monitor the well-being of the adopted child’. We suggest that 
this be a further factor to be taken into account when dealing with cases re-
sembling or directly related to inter-country adoption.
3   FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION 
In the words of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference, which is the 
custodian of the Hague Convention: 
26 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom (2001) (1) SA 46 (CC) para 26
27 Ibid. It also needs to be noted a guardianship order may have further implications related to South 
Africa’s obligation as a signatory to the Hague Convention. In international law, Article 18 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) imposes an obligation on signatory states that 
they refrain from defeating the object and purpose of a treaty. It is argued correctly by Charme that 
‘both conventional law and case law address the pre-ratification obligations of signatory states. To-
gether they establish the propriety of portraying the interim obligation to refrain from defeating the 
object and purpose of a treaty as customary law.’ See Charme JS ‘The interim obligation of Article 
18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Making sense of an enigma’ (1992) 25 George 
Washington Journal of International Law and Economics 77–78. For further sources that deem (at 
least) certain provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as reflective of customary 
international law, thereby binding upon all states, see Briggs HW ‘United States Ratification of the 
Vienna Treaty Convention’ (1979) 73 American Journal of International Law 470; Advisory Opinion 
of the International Court of Justice, ‘Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia’ (21 June 1971) 1971 I.C.J. 16, 46-47; see also ‘Fisheries jurisdiction (U.K. 
and Ir. v. Ice.)’, (2 February 1973) 1973 I.C.J. 3, 14, 18; see further ‘Appeal relating to the jurisdiction 
of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.)’, (18 August 1972) 1972 I.C.J. 46, 67. Accordingly, even if South 
Africa’s status as a State Party which has ratified the Hague Convention is dismissed because of the 
absence of domesticating municipal law to date, nevertheless as a signatory, South Africa has the 
obligation not to undertake any action that derails the spirit and purpose of the Hague Convention. 
Permitting High Courts to effect inter-country adoptions by conferring guardianship upon future 
adoptive parents, it is argued, can be considered to defeat, if not all, at least some of the purposes of 
the Hague Convention.
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‘The (Hague Adoption Convention) protects children and their families against the risks 
of illegal, irregular, premature or ill-prepared adoptions abroad. This Convention, … rein-
forces the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (Art. 21) and seeks to ensure that in-
ter-country adoptions are made in the best interests of the child and with respect for his or 
her fundamental rights, and to prevent the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children.’28
The Hague Convention seeks to cover all inter-country adoptions between 
countries becoming parties to it, whether those adoptions are partly prospec-
tive parent initiated or are arranged by public authorities, by adoption agen-
cies or by private providers of adoption services. It sets out a framework of 
internationally agreed minimum norms and procedures that are to be com-
plied with to protect not just the children involved, but also the interests of 
both their birth parents and their adoptive parents. Contracting States are 
free to maintain or impose requirements and prohibitions additional to those 
set out in the Convention. 
Discerning the main purposes of the Hague Convention is not a difficult 
task. In no particular order of priority, article 1 succinctly states the key objec-
tives as follows under the title ‘Scope of the Convention’:
‘The objects of the present Convention are:
(a)  to establish safeguards to ensure that inter-country adoptions take place in the best 
interests of the child and with respect to his or her fundamental rights as are recog-
nised in international law;
(b)  to establish a system of co-operation amongst Contracting States to ensure that 
those safeguards are respected and thereby prevent the abduction, the sale of, or 
traffic in children;
(c)  to secure the recognition in Contracting States of adoptions made in accordance 
with the Convention.’
It is instructive to note that, while both majority and minority judgments in 
De Gree refer to and discuss other articles of the Hague Convention (such as 
articles 4 and 5) in the text of the judgment, and to some of the elements set 
out in article 1 (such as the reference to article 1 in footnote 7 under para 11 
and the judgment of Ponnan JA at para 86, where, in addition to the sale of 
children, he details a list of abuses that have previously been associated with 
inter-country adoption processes), article 1 is not subjected to any sustained 
analysis in the case. We contend that, seen together with the substantive arti-
cles contained throughout the Convention, article 1 lays an essential basis for 
the examining the principal rationale justifying the Convention’s scheme and 
procedures, and hence enables us to compare the legitimacy of a guardian-
ship application in the High Court as a precursor to an inter-country adoption 
in its proper context. Hence, article 1 is used as the basis for the analysis that 
follows in the succeeding subsections.
28 Hague Conference on Private International Law <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.
display&tid=45> (accessed 24 July 2007)
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3.1   The principle that inter­country adoption is a rightful 
concern of public authorities
The very fact that there is in existence a private international law treaty able 
to be ratified by member states of the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law to regulate inter-country adoption does not necessarily explain 
the crucial point that inter-country adoption is not purely a matter for private 
legal regulation. Some of the Hague treaties deal with private law matters at 
an inter-country level (for instance, the enforcement of private maintenance 
orders obtained in a foreign jurisdiction) without disturbing the basic notion 
that the issue at hand still falls within the private sphere of interests of the 
respective parties. This is not the case with inter-country adoption. 
In relation to the Hague Convention, it has been clearly articulated that 
‘[o]ne of its basic premises is that adoption is not an individual affair, which can be left 
exclusively to the child’s birth parents or legal guardians, or to the protective adoption 
parents or other intermediaries, but rather a social and legal measure for the protection 
of children. Consequently, procedures for inter-country adoption should ultimately be 
the responsibility of the States involved, which must guarantee that the adoption corre-
sponds to the child best interests and respects his or her fundamental rights.’29 
Hence, provisions for the designation of a Central Authority,30 for the accredi-
tation of inter-country adoption service providers by such Central Authority,31 
and for notification at the time of deposit of the instrument of ratification of the 
Convention of ‘the identity and functions of the authority or authorities which, 
in that state, are competent to make the certification [of an adoption that has 
been effected] …’ ‘It shall also notify the depository of any modification in the 
designation of these authorities’,32 are all supportive of an extensive regulatory 
interest in, and oversight of, the process of inter-country adoptions as a matter 
of concern for the executive authorities, rather than private interests.33 Article 21 
of the Hague Convention even permits executive interference with a placement 
after the transfer of the child from his or her country of origin, and, as a last resort, 
for these public authorities to arrange for the return of the child in co-operation 
with the Central Authority of the country of origin. 
In this light, it is apparent that a ‘nude’ guardianship order, which can be 
effected merely as an ex parte application, taking place without the knowl-
edge, supervision or approval of a designated authority, cannot meet this 
objective and fundamental premise of the Hague Convention. While it is true 
29 Innocenti Digest ‘Inter-country adoption’ (1998) 5
30 Articles 6 and 7 of the Hague Convention
31 For instance, Articles 10, 11, and 12 of the Hague Convention
32 Article 23(2) of the Hague Convention
33 Brosca S ‘The Rights of the adopted child and the public family policies in Inter-country adoption’ 
in Alen A et al (eds)The UN Children’s Rights Convention: theory meets practice (2007) at 458 refers 
specifically to the ‘neoliberal’ approach towards inter-country adoption in the USA, which pertains 
more generally in family law as well. This approach, deduced from the website of the Department 
of State, regards ‘[i]nternational adoption as a private legal matter between a private individual or 
couple who wishes to adopt, and a foreign court which operates under that countries laws and regu-
lations’ (at 446). She contrasts this to the prevailing approach in Europe, where a ‘common element 
is seen in the existence of an authority charged with vigilance over the working and the supplying of 
post-adoption services … and the general tendency to set these services within the central structures 
of government dealing with the protection of children …’. 
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that in the case at hand, a social worker’s report was provided, this is neither 
required by the procedure for the acquisition of guardianship, nor is the in-
tervention of any other protective agency (such as the Office of the Family 
Advocate) mandatory. It is hence unclear as to how the assertion can be 
made that the procedures followed by the De Gree family met the ‘spirit’ of 
the Hague Convention.34 And, although a discussion of the full import of the 
recently promulgated sections of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (including 
those dealing with guardianship and the role of the High Court therein) lies 
beyond the scope of this note, we assert that the provision of the new Act 
which prescribes that any application for guardianship after the commence-
ment of the Act by non-nationals must be seen as an inter-country adoption 
and must then be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of chapter 16 
(which governs inter-country adoption)35 was surely inspired by the inherent 
lack of involvement of a competent public authority in guardianship applica-
tions, given the extensive role otherwise accorded the High Court in relation 
to guardianship in general. 
The point can also be made that inter-country adoption differs quite signifi-
cantly from domestic adoption, which has been until now (pending a raft of 
new provisions in the Children’s Act 38 of 2005) to a large extent a private af-
fair, with the extent of involvement of public authorities limited to the respec-
tive roles of the Commissioner for Child Welfare and the Registrar of Adop-
tions. Inter-country adoption, by contrast, adds the foreign Central Authority, 
the foreign accredited adoption service provider, the local Central authority 
and local accredited inter-country adoption service provider to the equation. 
Hence, it is a status changing event which falls properly within the sphere of 
the executive branch of government.
3.2   The foundational principles related to ‘co­operation’ and 
‘mutual recognition’ in article 1(b) and (c)
Secondly, as was echoed by the Constitutional Court in the context of the 
Hague Convention on Parental Child Abduction, it is also true for the Hague 
Convention on Inter-country Adoption that it ‘is intended to encourage comity 
between state parties to facilitate co-operation’.36 This system of co-operation 
amongst Contracting States helps to ensure that those safeguards upholding 
the child’s best interests are secured. Furthermore, the Hague Convention 
intends to ensure the recognition in Contracting States of adoptions made in 
accordance with the Convention, both as a matter of comity between Con-
tracting States,37 and to safeguard children’s interests.38 Indeed, viewed from 
34 Para 48 of the judgment of Heher JA
35 S 25 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005
36 Sonderup v Tondelli, 2001(1) SA 1171(CC) para 31
37 An illustration of the effect of comity in this sphere is to be seen in that fact that in an inter-country 
adoption from South Africa to Sweden, once the adoption is effected in the South African children’s 
court, the child immediately acquires Swedish citizenship (due to the prior involvement of the Swed-
ish Central Authority and their immediate recognition of the legal effects of the South African order 
of adoption) and the child therefore departs the country on a Swedish passport (Personal Commu-
nication, Swedish inter-country adoption service agency, 8 August 2007). 
38 Article 1 of the Hague Convention. The aspect of safeguards is dealt with further below.
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the angle of the Hague Convention, safeguarding the right of the child is in-
complete without ‘co-operation’ and ‘recognition’. 
The ‘co-operation’ principle of the Hague Convention is further articulated 
in a number of substantive Convention provisions, the details of which can-
not fully be explored here. Mention can be made, however, of article 7, deal-
ing with the requirement that central authorities ‘shall co-operate with each 
other and promote co-operation amongst the competent authorities in their 
states to protect children and to achieve the other objects of the Convention 
(emphasis inserted), of the provisions related to working agreements between 
Contracting States with a view to improving the application of the Conven-
tion in their mutual relations;39 and article 25, permitting other Contracting 
States to declare that they will not be bound under this Convention to recog-
nise adoption made in accordance with working agreements effected between 
other states.
As regards the policy objective underlying the ‘mutual recognition’ princi-
ple of the Hague Convention, it is obvious that since adoption necessarily en-
tails a change of legal status, that such events must occur in such a way as to 
permit ratifying states to agree upfront about the form and content of the legal 
consequences of an adoption that has taken place in the sending country, in 
the subsequent country of destination. In particular, it must be recorded that 
the South African version of adoption which severs the child’s legal relation-
ship with his or her forebears, and which creates a new one with prospective 
adopters,40 is not universally applicable as a legal construct, nor is it similarly 
understood and applied throughout the world. For example, there are coun-
tries, mainly Muslim countries, where the practice of adoption is usually not 
permitted (but Kafalah41 is) and hence an inter-country placement in this con-
text might necessitate the sending country ensuring that proper (alternative) 
recognition of the child’s legal status is undertaken. Such recognition is best 
not dealt with on an ad hoc basis by courts, but rather determined definitively 
in advance. Needless to say, a court faced with considering a guardianship 
order as a prelude to an inter-country transfer of a child has no duty to en-
quire into the nature and status of any adoption, or adoption-like order, in 
the country of destination. 
The protective aspects to the child of the ‘mutual recognition’ requirement 
are mentioned briefly below, but it is important to recognise that this is as 
much a question of comity and public policy as well. This dimension is in-
dicated by the requirement that children being adopted internationally have 
the right to equal standards and safeguards as are enjoyed in the national 
adoption system.42 The notion of equivalence of standards is further elabo-
rated in the Hague Convention in relation to many facets of the adoption 
39 Article 39(2) of the Haque Convention
40 See s 20 of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983.
41 Kafalah under Islamic Law entails the acceptance of children without families in what is tantamount 
to a permanent form of foster care, but without the children concerned taking on the family name or 
enjoying the right to inherit from the family with which they are placed. See Hodgkin R & Newell P 
Implementation handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (2002) 295–296.
42 Article 21(c) of the CRC
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process, including the safeguards provided for domestically to ensure that 
any parental consents are freely given, that equivalent time periods for the 
withdrawal of consent as are operative in national adoption practice are en-
forced, and that official records of the change of status of the child are main-
tained as is the case for in-country adoption (in South Africa, the records are 
kept centrally by the Registrar of Adoptions in accordance with section 17 of 
the Child Care Act 74 of 1983), and so forth. ‘Mutual recognition’, therefore, 
holds within it the idea that public authorities have the right to examine and 
pass judgment upon each other’s domestic standards and practices before 
concluding that an inter-country adoption process has satisfied the demands 
of international law. 
Clearly ‘mutual co-operation’ contemplates the prospect that Central Au-
thorities might have preferred working relationships, the source of which 
might be dictated by any number of reasons (language, culture, proximity, 
prior good relationships between government agencies or adoption service 
providers, and so forth). That this is envisaged is evident in the existing prac-
tice of working agreements between countries or accredited adoption agen-
cies in both sending and receiving countries.43 Indeed, the judgment in De 
Gree records that South Africa has, post ratification of the Hague Conven-
tion in 2003, entered into some such agreements, including with neighbour-
ing Botswana, a non-convention country, and begun using these working 
agreements as the practice mechanism for facilitating international adoption. 
However, the obverse side of this is that a state party can decide not to co-
operate with a particular country, or, on the basis of its own boni mores, not 
to consider as specific prospective adoptive parents at fitting applicants even 
though they may be recognised as suitable in the receiving contracting state 
(for instance, same sex applicants). Article 24 of the Hague Convention, too, 
permits a contracting party to refuse to recognise an adoption ‘manifestly 
contrary to its public policy’.  
Unfortunately, the De Gree case in general seems to accord at best little or 
no attention to the ‘co-operation’ and ‘mutual recognition’44 objectives of the 
Convention. Thus the minority judgments lament the fact that no structures 
had been put in place to facilitate an inter-country adoption to the USA, as 
if this was in some way negligent or remiss. Indeed, Heher JA comes close to 
suggesting that the applicants were discriminated against by a Departmental 
policy, which was restrictive and ‘not one which was likely to support or as-
sist a United States citizen’,45 and that this was the reason for the necessity of 
pursuing a guardianship application rather than an adoption in the children’s 
court. Rather, if proper regard is had to the practice under the Hague Conven-
tion, an authority is at liberty to choose with whom to pursue working rela-
43 See article 39 (2) and also Article 21 (d) of the CRC, which refers to bilateral and multilateral ar-
rangements or agreements.
44 For instance, reference is made to this under para 87 of the judgment. The minority judgment does 
not refer to it at all. 
45 Para 59 of judgment. He continues to say that ‘they make it clear that the Department and the 
agency do not regard themselves as properly equipped to handle such applications by reason of the 
lack of contact between the social welfare agencies of the respective countries’.
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tionships, based on national interest or any other factor. Equally, an authority 
is free to opt not to extend or foster working arrangements with other states.
3.3  Respect for other fundamental rights
Article 1(a) of the Hague Convention places emphasis on the need to respect 
the child’s ‘fundamental rights as recognised in international law’. This is in 
recognition of the fact that inter-country adoption does have a cross-cutting 
nature, impacting on various rights of the child. In particular, several Articles 
of the CRC and the ACRWC can be read in such a way as to bear upon the 
issue of inter-country adoption. However, time and space dictate here that 
only some of these rights are briefly discussed.
For instance, Article 8(1) of the CRC states, ‘State Parties undertake to 
respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nation-
ality, name and family relations as recognised by law without unlawful inter-
ference’. Therefore, the right of a child to a nationality and the prohibition 
against statelessness, by interpretation of article 1(a) of the Hague Conven-
tion, should not be subject to unlawful interference by inter-country adoption 
procedures. This right is not only entrenched in the CRC under article 7, but 
also under article 24(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (CCPR).46 What is envisaged is the need to avoid, that in ‘the context 
of considerable migration and the lack of harmonisation of domestic nation-
ality laws, it happens that a child does not have the nationality of the state 
where he or she is born and/or resides.’47
A combined reading of article 3 and article 7 of the CRC mandates that 
states need to undertake all necessary measures to allow all adoptive chil-
dren to obtain, as far as possible, information on the identity of their par-
ents,48 an additional right of the child at international law.
Article 9(1) of the CRC can also be applied to inter-country adoption. This 
provision requires states to ‘ensure that a child shall not be separated from his 
or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to 
judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, 
that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child’.49 This 
means that children should not be separated from their parents, including 
through inter-country adoption, unless it is necessary for their best interests. 
Besides, if the separation must inevitably take place, it should, as far as pos-
sible, take into account the consent of his or her parents and be fair.50
In addition, article 21 of the CRC, by declaring ‘that the best interests of 
the child shall be the paramount consideration’ with regard to adoption sys-
tems, appears to lay down a clear base from which all adoption policy should 
46 Article 24(3) of CCPR provides that ‘every child has a right to acquire a nationality’. 
47 Ziemele I ‘Article 7: The right to birth registration, name and nationality, and the right to know and 
be cared for by parents’, in Alen et al. (eds) A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the 
rights of the child (2007) 13
48 See for instance, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Kazakhstan (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/
Add.213), 2003, paras 45–46.
49 Emphasis inserted. Article 19 of the ACRWC incorporates a similar provision
50 Hodgkin & Newell (fn 41 above) 131
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flow.51 The use of the word ‘shall’ is quite forceful in this article. The man-
dates of article 21 are not a matter of discretion for State Parties. Article 21 
clearly delineates the CRC’s position with regard to inter-country adoption, 
on which the Hague Convention tries to build a more detailed structure. The 
best interests of the individual child must be conceptualised against the total-
ity of rights accorded the child at international law. Suffice to say that in the 
procedure it sets up for inter-country adoption, the Hague Convention makes 
it its object to uphold the rights mentioned above and other rights of the child 
as recognised in international law (some of which are explored in the next 
subsection). 
We argue that a guardianship application takes very little account of the 
overall rights of a child under international law, being premised as it is on an 
internal jurisdictional issue geared only to matters incidental to the exercise 
of one aspect (albeit an important one) of parental responsibility.
3.4   The principle of ‘establishing safeguards’ to ensure the 
best interests of the child in the Hague Convention
As already alluded to above, the Hague Convention is envisaged to serve as 
an effective tool to prevent abuse of, and fraud in, adoption processes. Apart 
from some of the issues briefly discussed above, it also engages with concrete 
adoption-related matters designed to protect children’s rights in a variety of 
ways, such as the need for proper counselling for both biological parents, 
adoptive parents and institutions whose consent is necessary;52 prevention 
of improper financial gains and of child trafficking, and the need to keep a 
record of the background of the child.53
The Hague Convention’s most beneficial contributions to the protection of 
the adoption triangle in practice can be seen in the procedural requirements 
(including matching), the recognition of certified adoptions by operation of 
law, the additional safeguards concerning contact between the adoptive and 
biological parents prior to consent and the treatment of information on the 
child’s origin.54 
The most horrific occurrence arising out of inter-country adoption today is 
the transnational trading of infants for adoption. A number of baby-traffick-
ing incidents in the context of inter-country adoption have been documented 
worldwide55 (and South Africa is not immune from this possibility), which 
demonstrate the complexity and pervasiveness of the problem. In addition 
to extorting exorbitant amounts of money from the adoptive parents, agents 
51 Graff NB ‘Inter-country adoption and the Convention on the rights of the child: Can the free market 
in children be controlled?’ (2000) 27 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 416
52 Article 4(c) of the Hague Convention
53 See, for instance, articles 31 and 32 of the Hague Convention.
54 See, for instance, articles 14, 15 and 19 of the Hague Convention.
55 See, for instance, Wittner KM ‘Curbing child-trafficking in inter-country adoptions: Will interna-
tional treaties and adoption moratoriums accomplish the job in Cambodia?’ (2003) 2 Pacific Rim 
Law and Policy Journal 595. 
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employ deceitful measures to wrest children from their birth mothers.56 Thus, 
the trafficking and ‘black market’ selling of children concern is not only about 
the victimisation of children, but also about unsavoury or irregular practices 
with respect to birth parents, and adoptive families.57
In order to prevent and regulate abuses and unethical practices in inter-
country adoption, the Hague Convention provides various safeguards. For 
instance, the Convention promotes the ‘no initial contact’ principle in inter-
country adoption. Where guided visits for prospective adoptive parents by 
local brokers to birth parents at home were not uncommon in order to obtain 
the latter’s consent in exchange for money, article 29 contains one of the most 
important safeguards with respect to the requirement of free consent.58 This 
provision generally prohibits any contact between the prospective adoptive 
parents and the biological parents or any other person caring for the child 
before the adoptability of the child and the eligibility and suitability of the 
parents are determined.59 Contact is allowed for in two cases only: Adoptions 
which take place within a family; and contact that is in compliance with the 
conditions established by the state of origin.60
The Hague Convention, by setting clearly the procedures for inter-country 
adoption with the involvement of the respective public authorities, minimises 
the risks involved in independent adoptions. For instance, independent adop-
tions,61 because they often occur with a very limited information base about a 
particular child’s family health history, emotional and physical background, 
could turn out to be disadvantageous in the long run if this information be-
comes important for the child’s well-being, leading to what are termed ‘dis-
rupted adoptions’.62 Independent adoptions also have the potential of mak-
ing adopting parents susceptible to risks involved in ‘adoptions for profit’.63
Another area where the Hague Convention is explicit in addressing the eth-
ics involved in adoptions relates to its requirement, inter alia, that payment 
is only allowed for costs and expenses thereby prohibiting improper finan-
56 Bisignaro SM ‘Inter-country adoption today and the implications of the 1993 Hague Convention on 
tomorrow’ (1994) 13 Dickinson Journal of International Law 127
57 See generally, for instance, Szejner CE ‘Inter-country adoptions: Are the biological parents’ rights 
protected?’ (2006) 5 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 211; Blair DM ‘Safeguard-
ing the interests of children in inter-country adoption: Assessing the gatekeepers’ (2005) 34 Capital 
University Law Review 349; Smolin DM ‘Child laundering: How the inter-country adoption system 
legitimises and incentivizes the practices of buying, trafficking, kidnapping, and stealing children’ 
(2006) 52 Wayne Law Review 113.
58 Van Loon H ‘Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in 
Respect of Inter-country Adoption’ (1995) 3 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 468
59 Rather, a prospective adoptive parent must first contact Central Authority in her home (or receiving) 
State. She must comply with all the domestic laws relating to adoption in her home State and then 
stand before her own Central Authority, or another accredited body, and show to their satisfaction 
that she is eligible and suited to adopt.
60 Article 29(a) of the Hague Convention
61 Completed without the help or aegis of a licensed social service agency, as opposed to those adop-
tions co-ordinated with the help of accredited adoption agencies.
62 Brosca (fn 33 above) 450 refers to summaries of recent studies indicating that in the USA, the me-
dium average percentage of disrupted inter-country adoptions or dissolved international adoptions 
is 10 per cent, in the Netherlands it is also 10%, in Great Britain 18.7 per cent and the recent Euro-
pean average is 5 per cent.
63 Meezan W et al, ‘Adoptions without agencies: A study of independent adoptions’ (1978) 7
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cial gain (including remuneration to authorities).64 Article 4, sub-paragraph 
(c)(3), and (d)(4), when read with article 32, forbids any financial gain that 
is not reasonable. It is argued further that ‘article 32 adopts a reasonable-
ness standard for costs and expenses, which include any professional ser-
vices rendered by the directors, administrators, and employees of any body 
involved in the inter-country adoption’ (emphasis inserted).65 The possibility 
that a Central Authority can have a ‘regulatory remedy which could require 
audit of adoption service providers that explicitly accounts for the legality of 
placements, the internal matching criteria, and the disbursement of all fees 
collected and donations accepted’66 facilitates further safeguards.
Although the Hague Convention does not place too much emphasis on the 
concept of culture of the child, it creates some room for its consideration. Arti-
cle 16 of the Convention sets forth the criteria for determining whether a child 
is ‘adoptable’. It states that ‘due consideration’ should be given to the child’s 
‘ethnic, religious and cultural background’.67 This seems to suggest that, as 
much as possible, the Hague Convention tries to protect and safeguard the 
cultural background of the child.
Articles 30 and 31 of the Hague Convention address another important 
issue concerning preservation of, access to and treatment of information re-
lating to the child’s origin – including both identity of the biological parents 
and medical history. Indeed, there is a growing consensus in the importance 
of knowing one’s biological roots and the origins of adoptees.68 As a result, 
the Convention makes it obligatory upon State Parties in all cases to preserve 
such information, independently of whether access to it is permitted by law of 
that state.69 In addition, in a clear reflection of the best interests of the child 
principle, article 35 requires that the ‘competent authorities of the Contract-
ing States shall act expeditiously in the process of adoption’.
The transition from mono-ethical and regionally restricted adoptions to 
transnational and transcultural procedures not only involves psychological, 
social and political problems, but above all legal problems resulting from the 
encounter between highly divergent and potentially conflicting legal orders. 
Hence, the requirement of co-ordination of inter-country adoption proce-
dures furthers the aim of controlling and preventing abuses that may violate 
the best interests of the child principle in relation to specific children and 
particular clashes between discordant legal systems. 
64 Article 32 of the Hague Convention
65 Katz LM ‘A modest proposal? The Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Re-
spect of Inter-country Adoption’ (1994) 9 Emory International Law Review 318
66 Eschelbach Hansen M & Pollack D ‘The regulation of inter-country adoption’ (2006) 45 Brandeis 
Law Journal 109
67 Article 16 (1) (b) of the Hague Convention
68 Brosca (fn 33 above) 460 noting that the right to an identity is a first generation right, says further 
that in inter-country adoption ‘it is a very important right because it has not only a genetic compo-
nent, but also a social component, that is, to be able to construct one’s identity it is essential to know 
where one comes from, who were one’s parents and how one was abandoned’ (at 460). She notes 
that one of the three ‘legs’ of the ‘travel to the past’ practice is the legal possibility of knowing the 
identity and social origin data related to one’s background.
69 Needless to say, such data should be treated with confidentiality.
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In this sense, the Hague Convention framework constitutes a model of co-
operation – combining shared responsibilities of sending and receiving state 
and automatic recognition – and can be qualified as an appropriate system 
for implementing and safeguarding children’s rights in inter-country adop-
tion. The creation of an international co-operation mechanism also opens 
up an entirely new field of control (as opposed to criminal procedures, anti- 
trafficking legislation and the like). As the Hague Convention continues to 
build co-operation between the most important supplying and demanding 
states in the inter-country adoption sphere, so, too, are practical safeguards 
for the protection of children being improved – in their best interests. 
This co-operation structure further helps to facilitate post-adoption serv-
ices that may be required for the child.70 This follow-up after adoption is in 
line with the recognition that ‘adoption is not an event but rather a process’. 
Thus, under articles 8 and 9 of the Hague Convention, the Central Authority 
must not only prevent improper financial gain from activities associated with 
international adoption and oversee adoption counselling, it should also ad-
dress issues of post-adoption services.71 It is argued, for instance, that these 
post-adoption services might include the Central Authority requesting peri-
odic reports on the status of the adoptive family.72
We contend that an application for an order conferring guardianship upon 
prospective adoptive parents is ill-suited to achieve all of the objectives that 
the Hague Convention puts in place to ensure the necessary safeguards. No 
information pertinent to the costs of independent lawyers or other profes-
sional generally emerges, for instance, and the De Gree case unfortunately 
illustrates only too starkly the importance for children in an inter-country 
adoption process of the ‘no contact’ rule.73 The Hague system is premised on 
specialised services, regulated and sanctioned by public authorities, which 
an applicant for guardianship can merrily circumvent. Finally, we suggest 
that permitting backdoor inter-country adoptions via the High Court also 
does not serve the overall national interest in combating fraud and irregular 
practice in the transfer of children abroad.74
That the guardianship route opens the door to an unsatisfactory mode of 
transfer of children internationally is even recognised by the host country of 
the applicants in this case. In this regard, the US Department of State (which 
70 See, further, Brosca (fn 33 above). 
71 A Central Authority should also exchange evaluation reports, and respond ‘to justified requests from 
other Central Authorities’ with regard to any shared adoption situations. The accredited bodies, to 
whom the Central Authority delegates limited powers, share responsibility for regulating the process 
of each adoption, as opposed to regulating the system. They ‘facilitate, follow and expedite’ adoption 
proceedings and follow through on post-adoption services and counseling. The accredited bodies 
present the advantage of relieving some of the pressure of having a single central authority.
72 Hillis L ‘Inter-country adoption under the Hague Convention: Still an attractive option for homo-
sexuals seeking to adopt?’ 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 255
73 Since one aspect of the applicant’s argument in support of their claim was that they had already built 
up a relationship with the child. 
74 South Africa has ratified the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, es-
pecially Women and Children supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime (20 February 2004) and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (30 June 2003).
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provides extensive information about the adoption processes in various coun-
tries and the concomitant legal requirements to bring a child adopted abroad 
to the United States) provides cause for concern.75 According to the US De-
partment of State, the route through the South African High Court guardian-
ship order is not a favourable option for would-be prospective adopters. The 
Department indicates (under a section labelled ‘Caution’) that:
There have been a number of cases in which American Citizens have been issued ‘Guard-
ianship Orders’ from the South African High Court. These orders do not constitute ‘irrevo-
cable release for adoption and immigration’ as required by United States Immigration 
Law. As such, they cannot be used for immigration purposes, essentially eliminating the 
possibility of Immediate Relative-4 (IR-4) visas (immigrant visas for orphans who will 
emigrate and be adopted in the United States) from South Africa.76
4.  CONCLUSIONS
Our remarks are made against the backdrop of the fact that inter-country adop-
tion needs a sound regulatory framework because of the various risks for, and 
implications that it has on, children’s rights. The fact that inter-country adoption 
is a specialised field within children’s rights (which by itself is a specialisation 
within the general human rights sphere) and even within adoption generally, 
it makes it an area that begs for a detailed and comprehensive response for its 
regulation. In its concluding observations to South Africa’s Initial Report, the 
CRC Committee has raised concern ‘at the lack of monitoring with respect to 
both domestic and inter-country adoptions.’77 The Committee has added its fur-
ther concern ‘at the inadequate legislation, policies and institutions to regulate 
inter-country adoptions.’78 The ratification and subsequent implementation of 
the Hague Convention via the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 will significantly address 
the concerns raised by the CRC Committee and others. 
We are of the view that the South African public authorities have, since 
ratification of the Hague Convention in 2003, taken considerable and meas-
urable steps towards giving effect to the obligations incurred at internation-
al law. Not only has an interim Central Authority been set up, procedures 
and operations manuals for implementation of inter-country adoptions been 
drafted, channels of communication with foreign accredited agencies and 
Central Authorities established and working agreements concluded, but in 
addition, the legislature has finalised the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, includ-
ing a chapter domesticating the Hague Convention, and those parts of the 
75 US Department of State ‘Intercountry adoption’ (June 2006) <http://travel.state.gov/family/adop-
tion/adoption_485.html> (accessed 23 July 2007)
76 US Department of State ‘Intercountry adoption: South Africa’ (June 2006) <http://travel.state.gov/
family/adoption/country/country_443.html> (accessed 23 July 2007). The South African Govern-
ment, through a questionnaire it sent to the Hague Conference on Private International Law, has 
indicated a similar concern. It states that ‘i) There are serious concerns about the abuse of guardi-
anship orders issued by the High court to remove children to other countries with the intention of 
adopting the child in another country. New legislation will prohibit this practice, but is not in place 
as yet.’ See <http://www.hcch.net/upload/adop2005_za.pdf> (accessed 23 July 2007). 
77 CRC Committee, concluding observations: South Africa (UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.122) (2000) para 
26
78 CRC Committee (note 77 above) para 26. It also needs to be noted that the Committee ‘further en-
courages the State party to reinforce its efforts to finalise its ratification of the Hague Convention of 
1993 on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Inter-country adoption’.
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Children’s Act which do not require regulations have already been promul-
gated. This history is correctly reflected in appropriate detail in the judgment 
of Ponnan JA.79 Were the Constitutional Court to sanction, at this advanced 
stage, an adoption-like procedure manifestly at odds with the executive’s and 
the legislature’s discernable intention, we suggest that this would come very 
close to violating the separation of powers doctrine and constitute interfer-
ence in the legitimate sphere of activity of the other branches of government, 
as Ponnan JA notes. 
As shown in the analysis above, some of the full implications underpinning 
the Hague Convention are not accorded proper appreciation in the case, par-
ticularly in the minority judgments. A guardianship order, it is argued here, 
does not come close to fulfilling a number of the principles of the Hague Con-
vention. To mention but two, the ‘co-operation’ and ‘recognition’ dimensions 
that are central to the Hague Convention are not addressed when a High 
Court guardianship procedure, as opposed to an adoption application in the 
children’s court, is followed. This is because, the involvement and role of 
‘public authorities’ in the sending and receiving states in the adoption proc-
ess, if existent at all, is very limited. The extensive regulatory interest in, and 
oversight of, the process of inter-country adoptions as a matter of concern for 
the executive will clearly not be catered for through a High Court procedure. 
The High Court process is party-centred, while a children’s court adoption 
process is not, and may even permit of competing applications by prospec-
tive adoptive parents (although highly unlikely in a properly conceived inter-
country adoption matter).
In addition, the guardianship order route would not guarantee the other 
safeguards that the Hague Convention proposes to promote on the basis of 
the best interests of the child. These safeguards include, as discussed above, 
the need for proper counselling for both biological parents, adoptive parents 
and institutions whose consent is necessary, curtailing improper financial 
gains, child trafficking, and the need to keep a record of the background of 
the child almost all of which, it is submitted, are paid insufficient or no atten-
tion by the De Gree case’s minority judgments. In contrast, the majority judg-
ments clearly understand the importance of the standards and safeguards, 
noting that these must be at least equivalent to those existing in the case of 
national adoption,80 and that foreign adoptive parents should not escape the 
strictures of the children’s court process.81
The ‘best interests of the child’ principle has been paid emphasis in the De 
Gree case by almost all judges. This is apposite, given the constitutional promi-
nence of the best interests of the child standard. However, we suggest that, 
whilst it is the very same principle that the Hague Convention makes central 
to its purpose, the full implications of how the best interests standard plays 
out in the substantive provisions of the Hague Convention have been insuf-
ficiently elucidated. The link to inter-country co-operation, as stated, has not 
79 At paras 89–93
80 See, for instance, para 15 of the judgment of Theron AJA.
81 See, for instance, the judgment of Ponnan JA at para 94.
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been specifically identified, and the traversal of children’s rights, such as the 
right to identity via the maintenance of records not mentioned. Further, the 
‘child-centred approach’ identified as lying at the heart of the international 
legal framework by Ponnan JA82 encompasses a broad understanding of the 
theoretical reach of the ‘best interests of the child’ in inter-country adoptions.
We contend, further, that if South Africa’s international obligations and the 
best interests of the child principle are to mean anything at all, it is impera-
tive that an inter-country adoption of this nature should meet the safeguards 
set out in the Hague Convention. As Judge Ponnan rightly provides ‘[w]hat 
the appellants ultimately sought was in effect an inter-country adoption’ even 
though ‘… how they hoped to achieve that was through the guise of some 
other application.’83 Of course, it is not only the best interests of this indi-
vidual child that is at stake, but also the best interests of other children in 
the Republic who might run the risk of having their rights violated as a result 
of the precedent that a case sanctioning an inter-country adoption though a 
guardianship order would set. 
In summary, the conclusions by Heher JA that ‘[e]very principle of the 
Hague Convention which is relevant to this application (and its spirit) has 
been satisfied’84 and that of Hancke AJA that ‘the applicants produced evi-
dence sufficient to satisfy the law of adoption in South Africa and the Hague 
Convention on Inter-country Adoption’85 do not hold water when assessed 
against the fundamental principles of the Hague Convention and its practice. 
If their conclusions are to be considered legally sound, an inchoate inter-
country adoption will have been set in motion, and, as our title suggests, that 
will indeed constitute (illicit) transfer by degree.
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